U.S. DISTRICT COURT
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
McNEIL, et al v. HARVEY, et al
Assigned to Judge Rudolph Contreras
Date Filed: 08/21/2017
17-cv-02602 McNEIL, et al v. BROWN, et al
Since 2014, Americans have filed at least TEN suits to stop what appears to be the institutionalized falsification of federal records concerning them. Specifically, victims complain that IRS never prepares substitute income tax returns on any date shown in IRS’ falsified annual records concerning targeted nontaxpayers.
But, no court has determined whether the Plaintiffs’ core allegation is true. That is, each named attorney, and others involved in Class cases to date, have avoided adjudicating the core fact controversy raised in the TEN fully-paid cases.
Instead, the named Defendants, and others, invariably fabricated and attributed to the litigants forms of relief THEY DID NOT SEEK, in order to draw each case within the prohibitions of the Anti-Injunction Act, to avoid making the fact determination requested, which only U.S. District courts can make, and thus they avoided adjudicating the ACTUAL merits of Class cases.
Plaintiffs contend that the uniform pattern of fraud by attorneys employed in the judicial branch, across all TEN Class cases discussed herein, proves such acts are not ‘mistakes’, but, describe a collusion among the attorneys to obstruct the administration of justice, in violation of victims’ First and Fifth Amendment-protected rights.
So, on August 21, 2017, thirteen (13) Plaintiffs filed suit against Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey, U.S. District Court Judge Christopher R. Cooper, and U.S. District Court Judge Dale A. Drozd. Harvey and Cooper hold court in Washington, D.C., while Drozd is in the Eastern District of California - Fresno.
Plaintiffs allege that, in ten (10) cases, the Defendant attorneys, and others, not only refused to resolve the core fact controversy raised by all victims similarly situated and similarly defrauded, but, instead, the attorneys falsified the records of each case by fabricating that victims sought relief they did NOT request. Thus, the attorneys brought each case, by fraud, within the ambit of Anti-Injunction Act prohibitions, in order to avoid adjudicating the cases on their ACTUAL merits.
Thus, those cases were dismissed, or recommended for dismissal, without having been adjudicated on their ACTUAL merits.
By filing this case, Plaintiffs seek a narrow six-part declaratory judgment deciding the following questions in regard to each of the TEN cases identified herein:
Did the Plaintiff complain, as their core fact contention, that IRS never prepares substitute income tax returns on any date shown in IRS’ falsified Individual Master File records concerning the targeted nontaxpayer?
Did the attorney appointed to adjudicate that core fact controversy do so?
Did the attorney falsify the case record by attributing to litigants relief they did NOT seek, i.e.., that Plaintiffs supposedly sought to enjoin IRS from preparing substitute income tax returns, then dismiss the case (or recommend dismissal) on the basis of that fabrication, thus drawing each case, by fraud, within the ambit of Anti-Injunction Act prohibitions?
Does the uniform falsification by attorneys, of the federal record of TEN separate fully-paid cases, provide strong circumstantial evidence victims’ cases, as filed, are meritorious?
Does the uniform falsification by attorneys, of the record in TEN Class cases, violate each Plaintiffs’ rights to adequate, effective and meaningful access to courts and to due process of law, and constitute, as well, obstruction of the administration of justice?
When attorneys uniformly falsify the record of TEN cases to avoid adjudicating their merits, do the dismissals have any precedential value or preclusive effect in regard to the unadjudicated fact controversy raised by Class victims?
Further, the Court is also requested to notice that:
It is not a “judicial act” to which immunity attaches when federal judges falsify the record of cases before their benches. Hence, the Defendants are not immune from suit by victims seeking to hold them responsible for falsifying and using falsified federal records to obstruct justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1503; that
Judicial immunity does not attach to the act of “using” attorney-falsified court records to justify refusing to adjudicate cases on their merits; that
Since the named attorneys are sued solely in personal capacity for their collusion to obstruct the administration of justice by refusing to adjudicate the merits of cases assigned them, the United States has no justifiable interest in providing a defense for the Defendants. The United States Attorney for the District of Columbia has filed Notice in this case on January 5, 2018 she is not providing a defense for Defendant Harvey in this case; that
Plaintiffs are not suing the Defendants because the attorneys “ruled against them”, but, instead, sue the attorneys because they refused to rule at all on the merits of Class cases, but uniformly falsified the record of each, then dismissed on the basis of their fabrications; and that
Plaintiffs are not seeking to obstruct the administration of justice or the administration of the tax laws, but, instead, seek to compel the offending judicial branch attorneys to cease obstructing the administration of justice and the proper administration of the tax law.
On September 21, 2017, Department of Justice attorney Ryan O. McMonagle filed a “Statement of Interest of the United States” wherein he stated:
By filing this case against these judges, Plaintiffs McNeil and Ellis have violated Judge Cooper’s April 19, 2017 Order of Permanent Injunction, entered in 16-cv-1053 Crumpacker v. United States.
On September 21, 2017, the United States initiated contempt proceedings against McNeil and Ellis for filing this action and suggests this Court stay any further proceedings pending the outcome of those contempt proceedings. [Note: McNeil and Ellis filed their “Opposition to Motion to Show Cause” on September 28, 2017. Further, on March 1, 2018, McNeil and Ellis appeared before Judge Cooper in his Court in Washington, D.C. for a hearing to show cause why they should NOT be held in contempt of court. Based on their oral testimony, Judge Cooper did not find that they violated his injunction and, therefore, did not find them in contempt of court.]
The United States is not a party to this matter and is not entering an appearance on behalf
of the federal defendants, but files this Statement of Interest under 28 U.S.C. § 517 to timely
protect the interests of federal officials and the orderly administration of justice.
The Plaintiffs served summonses to each of the three Defendants, who had sixty (60) days to respond, which none of them did, so, they defaulted.
Now, this is where the case gets interesting.
After the Defendants had defaulted, Judge Rudolph Contreras issued an Order on March 16, 2018 to the United States’ attorneys (Department of Justice) which said “…..the United States shall inform the Court of its position regarding service of the Defendants on or before March 30, 2018.”
Here’s the problem. Since the Defendant judges are being sued in their personal capacities, the DoJ cannot represent them. They must retain, and pay for, personal counsel.
So, Judge Contreras, acting extra-judicially, solicited DoJ to act as counsel on behalf of his Judicial Branch colleagues.
Following that Order, on March 30, 2018, DoJ attorney McMonagle filed a document entitled Statement of the United States with Respect to Service of Judicial Officer Defendants. Mr. McMonagle admits that “the United States is not a party to this matter”, but claims that the Defendants requested representation from the Department of Justice and that “an attorney shall make an appearance on their behalf in short order”.
On April 3, 2018, in response to McMonagle’s “Statement….”, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Strike Statement by Ryan O’Connor McMonagle, or alternativiely to Compel McMonagle to Support his (5) Claims. This Motion began with: “Ryan McMonagle is a serial filer of false and misleading claims into the record of each case he enters concerning the underlying IRS/DoJ record falsification program” and ended with this summary of the relief requested:
With respect to McMonagle Misrepresentation I, Plaintiffs request the Court compels Ryan to cite any portion of Plaintiffs’ complaint where, as he claims, they alleged the Defendant attorneys committed an “error” in dismissing their actions while falsifying the record with respect to allegations made and relief sought.
With respect to McMonagle Misrepresentation II, Plaintiffs request the Court compels him to provide each Defendant’s written request to the Department of Justice for representation in this case, dated before the filing of his “Statement” and before their window for response expired, and citing justification for the entry of a government attorney at the expense of the damaged United States to defend attorneys credibly accused of participating in an extra-judicial collusion to falsify federal records of class cases, to use falsified records to subvert their court’s jurisdiction, etc.
With respect to McMonagle Misrepresentation III, Plaintiffs request the Court compels him to cite ANY authority for his bald personal opinion/proposition that when federal judges are sued for colluding to jointly falsify federal records to defeat the jurisdiction of their courts, “the matter is in fact an action against them in their official capacities, rather than in their personal capacities”.
With respect to McMonagle Misrepresentation IV, Plaintiffs request the Court compels him to cite ANY authority justifying his claim that “judicial officers are immune from suits seeking purely declaratory relief”, such as Plaintiffs seek in this suit;
With respect to McMonagle Misrepresentation V, Plaintiffs request the Court compels him to cite ANY authority justifying his bald proposition/personal opinion that when personal capacity defendants in federal lawsuits fail to appear or otherwise defend during the window set by FRCP Rule 12 for their response to suits, that a motion seeking default judgment is “premature.”
Then, on April 5, 2018, DoJ attorney James Yu sent a letter to all the Plaintiffs advising them that he now represents Defendants Harvey, Drozd and Cooper and, according to Rule 5(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), all future correspondence and service of documents should be sent only to him and to refrain from sending any documents directly to the Defendants.
In response to Mr. Yu’s letter, on April 9, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Show Yu Authority & Prove the Interest of the United States. In this Motion, Plaintiffs stated “In an unprecedented move, on March 16th, 2018, the Hon. Judge Contreras directly invited the DoJ to represent the attorneys, thus procuring counsel at the expense of the United States for defaulted litigants before his bench. Plaintiffs can find no precedent, in the litigation history of our nation, where a United States Judge has procured free DoJ counsel on behalf of defaulted litigants.” And, in the last paragraph of the Motion, Plaintiffs stated unequivocally “Finally, should the Court take any further action to succor the defendants, similar to the Court’s invitation on March 16, 2018 to the DoJ to represent the defaulted Defendants, Plaintiffs notice the Honorable Rudolph Contreras of their intent to secure appropriate relief.”
Also on April 9, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Enter the Default of the Defendants.
As a follow-up to his letter, on April 10, 2018, DoJ attorney James Yu filed a Notice of Appearance, entering the case as counsel for Defendants.
Then, on April 13, 2018, DoJ attorney Yu bombarded the record by filing:
Failing to put forth any effort to prove his authority to represent the Defendants, Mr. Yu wrote the following: “Defendants are entitled to representation by Department of Justice attorneys pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 50.15. With regard to any other relief sought by Plaintiffs in their motion, Defendants take the position that the motion is frivolous and merits no further response.” [Note: More to follow in Plaintiffs’ response.]
Attorney Yu continued his assault when, on April 23, 2018, he filed Defendants' Motion for An Order Directing Plaintiffs to Comply with FRCP Rule 5(b)(1). In this Motion, he moved the Court to rule that a violation of this order “shall be deemed a contempt of court and punishable as such”. Accompanying the Motion was a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for An Order Directing Plaintiffs to Comply with FRCP Rule 5(b)(1). In this Memorandum, he stated “Despite the explicit notice and instructions from undersigned counsel, however, Plaintiffs continue to send their legal papers directly to each of the defendants—including at their personal residences. Moreover, Plaintiffs appear to question whether undersigned counsel in fact represents Defendants. The receipt of mail regarding this case at the homes of the judges is suspicious and harassing, and has raised concerns by at least one of the judges and the U.S. Marshals Service.”
On April 23, 2018, Plaintiffs countered and filed their
Under 28 C.F.R. §50.15, “a federal employee (hereby defined to include present and former Federal officials and employees) may be provided representation in civil, criminal and Congressional proceedings in which he is sued, subpoenaed, or charged in his individual capacity, not covered by §15.1 of this chapter, when the actions for which representation is requested reasonably appear to have been performed within the scope of the employee's employment and the Attorney General or his designee determines that providing representation would otherwise be in the interest of the United States.”
Further, “Unless the employee's employing federal agency concludes that representation is clearly unwarranted, it shall submit, in a timely manner, to the Civil Division or other appropriate litigating division (Antitrust, Civil Rights, Criminal, Land and Natural Resources or the Tax Division), a statement containing its findings as to whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment and its recommendation for or against providing representation.”
In this case, pursuant to 28 CFR §50.15, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC) is the “agency” responsible for determining, pre-referral to the DoJ, whether or not the felonious extra-judicial collusion of the Defendant attorneys was “within the scope of their employment”, and whether or not this case should have been referred to the DoJ to secure representation for the Defendants.
The proxy trio of attorneys (Jessi K. Liu, James Yu, and Richard Zuckerman) admit/concede the AOUSC did not “submit in a timely manner” the personal capacity suit to the DoJ, [See “Defendants' Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment”, Pg.2, footnote 2]. The trio are also likely aware that the AOUSC, if any referral was actually ever made, may have committed fraud to secure DoJ representation, after the Defendants defaulted.
For relief, “Plaintiffs move the Court to order the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the Department of Justice to present forthwith:
1. The written timely determination made before the default dates of each attorneys, or on any date, by both agencies, as required by law, that ALL the specific acts by the Defendants of which Plaintiffs complain, were “within the scope of employment” of the Defendants, and disclose to this Court
2. The precise claimed “interest” the United States has in providing free representation to attorneys sued, inter alia, for their extra-judicial collusion to falsify the federal record of TEN cases in identical manner, in order to justify dismissals without adjudicating the cases’ merits.
In alternative, Plaintiffs move the Court strike all filings by the proxy DoJ attorneys, who cannot show proof that the AOUSC and the DoJ made the determination that ALL acts the Defendants committed, of which Plaintiffs complain, to destroy the jurisdiction of their courts over TEN suits, were “WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT,” hence the proxy lawyers were inserted into this case in violation of the rules set forth in the controlling law: 28 C.F.R. §50.15, pursuant to the procurement of their entry by The Hon. Rudolph Contreras on March 16, 2018.”
Then, on May 1, 2018, DoJ attorney Yu filed the Government’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in which he claims “Plaintiffs have sued Defendants, in their individual capacities, for alleged constitutional violations. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ only available avenue to recovery against Defendants, in Defendants’ individual capacities, is through Bivens.” He then cites two cases to support his claim: Sanchez v. McLain, 867 F. Supp. 2d 813 , 816-17 (S.D.W.V. 2011); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (“Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right.”). But, here’s his problem. Plaintiffs are not seeking to recover damages from the Defendants - only a declaratory judgment from the Court.
Mr. Yu continues his defense of the judges who have acted corruptly to perpetuate the IRS’ record falsification scheme that has destroyed the lives of so many innocent Americans. He states “Plaintiffs persist in characterizing Defendants’ actions as criminal and extra-judicial. Specifically, Plaintiffs appear to be focused on two types of allegations. The first consists of allegations that Defendants falsified court records when they found that the relief sought by Plaintiffs in the Underlying Cases was barred by the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, and the second type of allegation accuses Judge Cooper and Judge Jackson of engaging in a nefarious conspiracy when six of the Underlying Cases were consolidated. Setting aside that none of these acts were objectively improper, the actions of which Defendants are accused fall well within the scope of their judicial authority. As a comparison, in the context of judicial immunity, which also requires that the action be taken within the scope of judicial authority, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” And, “Even if Defendants had engaged in the actions maliciously, as Plaintiffs claim (and as Defendants deny), the actions Defendants took all fell squarely within the scope of their authority.”
Let that statement sink in for a minute. A DoJ attorney admits that Federal judges are virtually immune from being held accountable for their errors, malicious actions, or actions in excess of their authority.
Mr. Yu persisted in his arguments against the Plaintiffs’ filing of this case by claiming that appellate relief existed: “Plaintiffs’ modus operandi is to sue judges when those judges issue unfavorable decisions. For example, after their appeals in several of the Underlying Cases were rejected, Plaintiffs reacted by claiming that they were also victims of wrongdoing by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and that they now have no way to obtain appellate relief. Nevertheless, even if Plaintiffs were the victims of a wide-ranging conspiracy spanning both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, it would still be untrue that they had no access to appellate relief because they still had the option of appealing to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2101; see also Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 2000) (observing that the remedy for alleged judicial misconduct is appeal to the appellate court or the Supreme Court).”
[Note: Plaintiffs filed multiple appeals in both the D.C. Appellate Court and the Supreme Court, but, the Appellate Court issued unsigned, unpublished opinions, merely rubber-stamping and affirming the District Court’s rulings without stating its standard of review. And, the Supreme Court docketed, but chose not to hear, Plaintiffs’ appeals. Please refer to Case 17-cv-2602 McNeil, et al v. Brown, et al .]
Finally, Mr. Yu continues his incoherent ramblings with this: “It is apparent that Plaintiffs are either unwilling or unable to accept that the Underlying Cases were not a proper vehicle for pursuing their claims against the Internal Revenue Service regarding the preparation of returns pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6020. A lawsuit against the judges who ruled against Plaintiffs is not an appropriate way for Plaintiffs to express their disappointment, however, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants should not be made to endure further harassment by Plaintiffs through this frivolous lawsuit. For all the reasons stated, the Court should grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.”
Then, he ends with this footnote: “It is obvious that Plaintiffs’ ultimate goal is to obtain a declaratory judgment against the United States with respect to taxes, but Plaintiffs would have been barred from seeking such a remedy against the United States by the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act. Suing judges instead to obtain a declaratory judgment that would have no effect unless it was binding on the United States is nothing more than pleadings gamesmanship. The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ suit with a warning and sanctions if such tactics are attempted again so as to prevent further harassment of these Defendants and of judges deciding other tax cases.”
[Note: In this single document, Mr. Yu misrepresents Plaintiffs’ lawsuits as tax cases, when in fact, they were filed to enjoin (stop) IRS from committing fraud by falsifying its records to make it appear IRS prepared Substitute For Returns (SFRs) for so-called “non-filers”, when evidence from its own records verified that SFRs are never prepared for anyone, on any date. And, further, by threatening Plaintiffs with sanctions, he reveals that the Government will stop at nothing, even violating Plaintiffs’ rights to access the Courts, in order to bleed the American people dry with a confiscatory, complex, corrupt and fear-based tax system.]
On May 4, 2018, Plaintiffs filed:
The “Emergency Motion to Compel Production…..” was filed because the Government claims that the source of its authority to represent the Defendants is not open to judicial review and Plaintiffs have no right to see the Defendants’ applications for DoJ representation. Plaintiffs have reason to believe, and do believe, that the Defendants never actually requested representation, as required by 28 CFR §50.15, but, resulted from Judge Contreras’ extra-judicial Order of March 16, 2018.
Plaintiffs contend that the destruction of their RIGHTS to sue the defendant attorneys individually cannot lawfully result from secret decisions made by government servants, claiming such decision is shielded from judicial review. Thus, any AOUSC’s (Administrative Office of the United States Courts) referral documentation to the DoJ in this case IS subject to judicial review, since it is resulting in the destruction of Plaintiffs’ rights to sue attorneys personally. And, if the AOUSC made no such referral, or made a referral recommending against DoJ representation, the trio of attorneys (Liu, Yu and Zuckerman) will be shown to have injected themselves into this personal capacity case without any lawful authority whatsoever.
For relief, Plaintiffs respectfully requested that the Court IMMEDIATELY ORDER:
1.) the AOUSC to provide the timely made, written request by each defaulted attorney for representation by the DoJ, and IMMEDIATELY ORDER
2. the AOUSC to provide the “statement” whereby the agency supposedly referred this case to the DoJ, with all supporting documentation, thus, destroying Plaintiffs’ rights (in this case) to sue the defaulted attorneys individually.
[Note: As a result of the Government’s refusal to provide proof that the Defendants actually submitted written requests for representation, Plaintiffs filed a new case, the purpose of which was to obtain those documents from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC). [See Case 18-CV-1746-TSC Stanley, et al v. Duff, et al].
In Plaintiffs’ “Objection to Attorneys' Motion for Order Directing Plaintiffs to Comply with DoJ Misrepresentation of Rule 5”, Plaintiffs request the following relief:
1.) the Court holds a hearing or otherwise makes a determination whether or not DoJ lawyers Liu, Yu and Zuckerman have authority to enter what they concede in their filings is a strictly personal capacity suit; until
2.) the DoJ three present some authority supporting their claim that FRCP Rule 5 includes the word “ONLY” as they pretend; until
3. the DoJ attorneys present EVIDENCE that one of the defaulted Defendants feels they are being “harassed” by Plaintiffs’ service of standard, respectful documents filed in this case; and until
4. someone in the U.S. Marshals Service, with competence to testify, swears that Plaintiffs’ service of court documents upon the defaulted attorneys is, in some manner, “suspicious”, Plaintiffs request the Court deny the Motion for Order Directing Plaintiffs to Comply with the attorneys’ bald, bold, deliberate misreading of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 5.
On May 15, 2018, in light of the Government’s continued attack on Plaintiffs’ rights, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Notice Filing of Petition in the Supreme Court Concerning Improper Entry of United States Into This Case.
On May 16, 2018, in response to Plaintiffs’ Objection to Attorneys' Motion for Order Directing Plaintiffs to Comply with DoJ Misrepresentation of Rule 5, DoJ filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Order Directing Plaintiffs to Comply with FRCP Rule 5b.
In this 5-page document, Mr. Yu offers the following:
When Plaintiffs objected to DoJ improperly injecting the word “only” into Rule 5, significantly changing its meaning, he responds “Defendants believe that the language of Rule 5(b)(1) is clear and speaks for itself, and - contrary to Plaintiffs’ accusations - undersigned counsel has in no way misrepresented the text of the rule. Nevertheless, even if the Court interprets Rule 5(b)(1) differently, it is within the Court’s equitable power to order Plaintiffs to serve documents only upon Defendants’ counsel.” [Note: No Order was ever issued requiring Plaintiffs to serve documents only upon Defendants’ counsel.]
When Plaintiffs requested proof that the mailing of their documents directly to Defendants constituted “harassment”, as allegedly stated by U.S. Marshals, he wrote “Plaintiffs question the veracity of Defendants’ claims regarding the burdens created by Plaintiffs’ frequent mailing of packages to federal judges’ personal residences. They demand that Defendants produce evidence (i.e., testimony from the U.S. Marshals Service and statements from Defendants) to support Defendants’ claims regarding these packages. These demands are unreasonable and disproportionate to the issue at hand.”
Further, he says “Plaintiffs would suffer no prejudice or burden if the Court granted Defendants’ motion. Indeed, Plaintiffs would be saved the not-insignificant cost of postage they expend by mailing documents to each of the defendants. In contrast, the cost in both time and money to produce a representative from the U.S. Marshals Service would be a complete waste of resources. Moreover, Defendants have already made clear in their moving brief, that they have felt harassed by Plaintiffs’ mailings.”
He ended by stating this: “Plaintiffs have brought this baseless suit against federal judges. Those judges are now represented by undersigned counsel. Under normal circumstances, with conventional litigants, Defendants’ initial request regarding service would have been sufficient and Defendants would not have needed to seek relief from the Court. Instead, Plaintiffs have chosen to fight Defendants on this issue -apparently because they do not believe that Defendants are represented by undersigned counsel. Plaintiffs have offered no other reason why they should be permitted to continue mailing documents to Defendants, nor have they suggested that they would suffer any harm by having the motion granted. Therefore, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motion and order Plaintiffs to comply with Rule 5(b)(1). In the alternative, the Court should grant Defendants’ requested relief pursuant to its equitable powers.”
On May 21, 2018, DoJ attorney Yu filed Defendants’ 4-page Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' (sic) Emergency Motion to Compel Production, stating “Since undersigned counsel first made his appearance in this case, Plaintiffs have challenged his authority to represent Defendants. To be clear, the Government’s decision to provide federal employees with representation by a Department of Justice (“DOJ”) attorney is not subject to judicial review. This is true even though Plaintiffs believe that Defendants’ conduct was outside the scope of their authority. Furthermore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to documentation regarding the Government’s decision.”
“Plaintiffs challenge undersigned counsel’s authority to represent Defendants and seek discovery on the AOUSC’s and the DOJ’s determinations resulting in such representation. The Court does not have jurisdiction to review these discretionary acts, and Plaintiffs have neither a right nor standing to challenge or seek discovery on these issues. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ claims, they have not been harmed by the Government’s decision to provide Defendants with representation. That decision had no impact on Plaintiffs’ claims, and the effect is the same as if Defendants had retained private counsel instead. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel should be denied.”
On May 30, 2018, Plaintiffs their Response to May 21, 2018 Filing by UNAUTHORIZED Attorneys, which begins “Without a hint of embarrassment, the trio of unauthorized attorneys, inserted without authority into this case, have now abandoned their previous frivolous misrepresentation that Plaintiffs were supposedly suing the Defaulted attorneys in official capacity. They now concede otherwise. But, despite their claim the AOUSC did not properly/timely request DoJ representation, and despite the fact their improper entry has destroyed Plaintiffs’ rights to compel the defaulted attorneys to appear and answer for their conceded collusion to falsify the federal record of TEN cases, the unauthorized DoJ attorneys persist in obstructing justice.”
For relief, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court
1. Notice the unauthorized DoJ attorneys have abandoned their specious, frivolous claim Plaintiffs are supposedly suing the defaulted Defendant attorneys in this case in official capacity,
2. Notice Mr. Yu’s claim the AOUSC did NOT properly/timely refer the case to the DoJ,
3. Notice that entry by the DoJ has destroyed Plaintiffs’ ability to compel the defaulted defendants to appear and answer for their collusion on September 26, 2016,
4. Notice that defaulted defendant Cooper concedes he colluded with Amy Berman Jackson on Sept. 26, 2016, then falsified the record of SIX cases, as she directed, on December 31, 2016, making it appear victims of the IRS record falsification program were attempting to enjoin IRS from preparing returns, (despite his knowledge no such returns exist to enjoin), and
5. Notice that the provision of free counsel to the Defendants is GROSSLY violative of fundamental fairness.
Further, Plaintiffs move the Court to
6. Compel the AOUSC to simply provide the documentation proving DoJ was properly inserted into this case, despite the claim by James Yu of the AOUSC’s failure to timely provide documentation to the DoJ;
7. Strike the Opposition filed by Mr. Yu on May 21, 2018, after a finding the AOUSC did not procure DoJ representation in a procedurally proper fashion; and to
8. Compel the DoJ to provide free representation to Plaintiffs, to ensure both Defendants AND the long-suffering, ever-patient Plaintiffs are equally represented at Government expense.
On June 5, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their 5-page Motion to Notice Docketing in the Supreme Court of Plaintiffs’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus. The Petition was assigned cause number 17-1562, placed on the docket on May 18, 2018 and styled “In Re Harold R. Stanley, et al., Petitioners”
On September 26, 2018, in spite of Plaintiffs’ well-pled arguments, Judge Contreras granted Defendants’ April 13, 2018 Motion to Dismiss:
On October 14, 2018, in response to Judge Contreras’ Order of Dismissal, Plaintiffs filed:
On November 7, 2018, DoJ attorney Yu filed Defendant's Opposition Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion to Alter-Amend or Withdraw Judgment.
On November 14, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their Response to Defendant's Opposition Plaintiffs' Rule 59e Motion to Alter-Amend Judgment.
Continuing his attack on Plaintiffs, on November 16, 2018, DoJ attorney Yu filed Defendants’
The Order reads: “Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1), Plaintiffs shall cease sending pleadings and other papers in this case to the individual Defendants. Instead, Plaintiffs shall make service of pleadings and other papers upon Defendants only by sending documents to Defendants’ attorney of record, James Yu, as required by Rule 5.
It is further ORDERED that, if any Plaintiff fails to obey this Order by sending pleadings or other papers in this case directly to any of the Defendants, such failure shall be deemed a contempt of Court and punishable as such.”
On November 19, 2018, Plaintiffs countered by filing:
Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to STRIKE ALL DoJ Filings in 1720 and 2602, which reads “After giving due consideration to Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Strike ALL DoJ Filings, with multiple sworn Declarations in Support, noting as well the failure of the Head of DoJ’s Tax Division, Mr. Richard E. Zuckerman, to provide ANY evidence whatsoever that the Defendants timely filed a request for DoJ representation with their supervising agency, (the Administration Office of the United States Courts, “AOUSC”), and noting as well the failure of Mr. Zuckerman to provide ANY evidence the AOUSC timely provided the two part referral of this case and 17-2602 to the Department of Justice as required by controlling law, 28 C.F.R. §50.15, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that all filings entered by the Department of Justice into cases 17-1720 and 17-2602 be stricken, since entry of the DoJ into this case was NOT AUTHORIZED.
Undeterred, on November 26, 2018, Mr. Yu filed
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Renewed Motion for an Order Directing Plaintiffs to Comply with FRCP Rule 5(b)(1) and Motion to Strike, which contains the following points:
The Court has already recognized the DOJ’s decision to provide representation falls squarely within the agency’s discretion and is not subject to judicial review. Defendants should not be subjected to service of all of Plaintiffs’ filings just because Plaintiffs refuse to accept settled law.
Plaintiffs question the veracity of Defendants’ claims regarding the burdens created by Plaintiffs’ frequent mailing of packages to federal judges’ personal residences. They demand that Defendants produce evidence (e.g.., declarations from the Defendants) to support Defendants’ claims regarding these packages. Dkt. no. 49 at 3. These demands are inappropriate. Defendants ask only that service be directed solely to Defendants’ counsel.
Plaintiffs have raised no legitimate grounds for seeking a motion to strike the filings. As already discussed, supra, the DOJ is authorized to represent Defendants. More to the point, undersigned counsel filed a notice of appearance and is counsel of record for Defendants. Plaintiffs’ refusal to accept that Defendants are represented by the DOJ is insufficient grounds to grant such an extreme remedy, especially where none of the factors set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) apply.
Plaintiffs’ attempts to challenge Mr. Yu’s authority to represent Defendants is a waste of the Court’s time. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs continue to serve their legal filings upon Defendants at their personal residences despite the terms of Rule 5(b)(1). Given the unique circumstances of this case, the Court should grant Defendants’ motion.
Continuing to counter Mr. Yu’s weak arguments, on November 26, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their Renewed Motion to Strike All DoJ Filings.
And, given that Judge Contreras had failed to timely rule on their Rule 59e Motion to Alter-Amend or Withdraw Judgment, on January 15, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Set Rule 59(e) Motion for Immediate Hearing or Render Judgment.
Finally, on February 28, 2019, Judge Contreras responds by DENYING Plaintiffs’ Rule 59e Motion:
On April 26, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal as to Judge Contreras’ Memorandum & Opinion, Order on Motion for Order, Order on Motion to Compel, Order on Motion to Strike, Order on Motion to Take Judicial Notice, Order on Motion for Extension of Time to, Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Default Judgment, Order on Motion to Dismiss, and Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction.
Then, on May 1, 2019, the U.S. District Court clerk transmitted Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed (Memorandum Opinion), and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals $505.00 filing fee was also paid this date.
On May 7, 2019, the Court of Appeals established case #19-5127.
Following are the Docket Sheets containing links to all the documents filed in this case.
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit